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Abstract
Airborne volcanic ash is one of the most common, far-travelled, direct
hazards associated with explosive volcanic eruptions worldwide. Man-
agement of volcanic ash cloud hazards often requires coordinated efforts
of meteorological, volcanological, and aviation authorities from multiple
countries. These international collaborations during eruptions pose
particular challenges due to variable crisis response protocols, uneven
agency responsibilities and technical capacities, language differences, and
the expense of travel to establish and maintain relationships over the long
term. This report introduces some of the recent efforts in enhancing
international cooperation and collaboration in the Northern Paciﬁc region.
1 Introduction
Airborne volcanic ash is one of the most com-
mon, far-travelled, direct hazards associated with
explosive volcanic eruptions worldwide. Man-
agement of volcanic ash cloud hazards often
require coordinated efforts of meteorological,
volcanological, and civil aviation authorities
from multiple countries. These international
collaborations during eruptions pose particular
challenges due to variable crisis response proto-
cols, uneven agency responsibilities and techni-
cal capacities, language differences, and the
expense of travel to establish and maintain rela-
tionships over the long term. The steady rise in
global aviation, particularly on the remote routes
between North America and Asia that overfly
more than 100 potentially active volcanoes in the
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United States (Alaska and Aleutian Islands) and
the Russian Federation (Kamchatka and Kurile
Islands), means that more and more aircraft are at
risk from the impacts of airborne volcanic ash.
The Northern Paciﬁc (NOPAC) air routes
connecting Alaska to the far east (Fig. 1) carry
10,000 people per day and up to 50,000 aircraft
per year with some routes passing over the
Kamchatka Peninsula with around 30 volcanoes
(Gordeev and Girina 2014; VAAC Anchorage
2015a). Commercial aircraft in this region are
required to operate on a ﬁxed route and flight
level approved by Air Navigation Service Pro-
viders (ANSPs). They need an approval before or
during a flight when they change their route
and/or flight level; re-routing to avoid a volcanic
eruption is no exception. Over the past two
decades, more than 60 strong explosive eruptions
in the Russian Far East (Girina et al. 2007, 2009,
2014a, b; Gordeev and Girina 2014; McGimsey
and Neal 1996; McGimsey and Wallace 1999;
McGimsey et al. 2003, 2004a, b, 2005, 2008,
2011, 2014; Neal and McGimsey 1997; Neal
et al. 2004, 2005a, b, 2009a, b, 2011, 2014) have
tested coordination among relevant agencies and
institutions in Japan, the Russian Federation, the
United States, and Canada, prompting ongoing
testing of existing systems with a number of
lessons learned. Critical to meeting this challenge
of a rapid, international response to volcanic ash
cloud hazard is development of written, updated,
and practiced response plans or agreements
detailing roles and responsibilities.
Frequent exercises that test the readiness and
procedures, involving representatives of interna-
tional air carriers, are important tools to contin-
ually reﬁne the response process. A mechanism to
engage air carriers and critically evaluate indi-
vidual eruption responses to events is also nec-
essary to focus these improvements. Each of the
three main components of ash cloud response:
meteorology, volcanology, and air trafﬁc man-
agement, have different challenges in obtaining a
seamless coordinated response. The establish-
ment of a worldwide system of Volcanic Ash
Advisory Centres (VAACs) in the mid-1990s
assisted greatly in development of a consistent
meteorological response and warning product
suite. Similarly, the mature system of interna-
tional conventions in air trafﬁc management
contributes signiﬁcantly to coordinated handling
of air trafﬁc during eruptions that may disrupt the
air routes. However, there remains strong vari-
ability in the adequacy of volcano surveillance
and alerting by appropriate regional volcanolog-
ical authorities, a challenge increasingly met by
the growing use of remote and satellite based
monitoring and eruption detection techniques.
Recent eruptions of Sarychev-Peak Volcano in
2009 (McGimsey et al. 2014) and Kliuchevskoi
Fig. 1 Route map in the Northern Paciﬁc region
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Volcano in 2013 (Girina et al. 2014a, b) illustrate
aspects of both the successes and ongoing chal-
lenges of international eruption response in the
Northern Paciﬁc, as well as worldwide.
2 VAACs and Volcano
Observatories Related to Volcanic
Ash Clouds in the Northern
Pacific Region
To avoid aircraft-related disasters caused by
volcanic ash clouds, a framework for the Inter-
national Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) was
established in 1993 by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO). Under this
framework, nine VAACs were designated as
centres to monitor volcanic eruptions and to
provide information on the locations and move-
ment of volcanic ash clouds as well as an outlook
for their regions of responsibility (Fig. 2). In the
Northern Paciﬁc region, there are four VAACs:
Anchorage, Montreal, Tokyo and Washington.
Among them, VAAC Anchorage has the area of
responsibility covering the entire Anchorage
Flight Information Region (FIR) as well as an
area bounded on the west by 150°E Longitude
and on the south by 60°N Latitude, which
includes all the volcanoes within the State of
Alaska. VAAC Anchorage’s area of responsi-
bility is adjacent to volcanoes located in Kam-
chatka Peninsula and the Northern Kurile
Islands, which are in the area of responsibility of
VAAC Tokyo that covers the East Asia and
Northwest Paciﬁc regions. Several volcanoes in
the region are quite active and ash clouds often
move across the boundary of the area of
responsibility of these two VAACs where the
VAACs hand over the responsibility of infor-
mation issuance through close coordination and
communication. This chapter mainly highlights
the activities of these two VAACs and related
organizations in the region.
VAAC Anchorage was established by the
United States Department of Commerce
(DOC) National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s (NOAA) National Weather
Service (NWS) at the request of the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). It has been
providing information on volcanic ash clouds in
the form of Volcanic Ash Advisories (VAAs)
around the clock, supporting the Anchorage
Meteorological Watch Ofﬁces (MWO) and the
Anchorage Area Control Center (ACC).
Fig. 2 Areas of responsibility of all VAACs as of October 2016
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VAAC Tokyo has been monitoring volcanoes
around the clock and issuing VAAs since 1997.
It is a part of the Japan Meteorological Agency
(JMA). VAAC Tokyo was originally established
in the Tokyo Aviation Weather Service Center,
the branch ofﬁce of JMA located at Haneda
Airport, and was transferred to JMA headquar-
ters in Tokyo in 2006. Through the experience of
several signiﬁcant eruptions such as that of Sar-
ychev Peak in 2009, VAAC Tokyo strengthened
the operations by allocating ﬁve forecasters
speciﬁc for volcanic ash in 2011, while not all
VAACs have their own forecasters (in such
VAACs, forecasters share other aviation duties,
too). VAAC Tokyo supports MWO Tokyo, also
a part of JMA, as well as the ACCs in the area
(JMA/VAAC Tokyo 2015).
As for VAAC operations, early detection of
volcanic eruptions is crucial. To enable timely
VAA provision, a VAAC monitors satellite
imagery for volcanic ash clouds around the
clock. Whenever a new eruption is identiﬁed, it
announces the possibility of eruption through
VAA issuance and continues VAA provisions
until the volcanic ash cloud is dissipated. How-
ever, as satellite imagery is not continuous data,
the initial detection can be delayed. For example,
the new satellite of HIMAWARI-8, that was
launched on October 7, 2014 and has been
operational since July 7, 2015, principally pro-
vides imagery every ten minutes, and MTSAT-2,
still in operation as a back-up, provides imagery
twice per hour. Therefore, adding to the data
from satellites, VAACs Anchorage and Tokyo
also receive information about eruptions from
relevant volcano organizations and sometimes
from aircraft in operation. For example, the
Alaska Volcano Observatory (AVO), operated
conjointly by the University of Alaska and the
United States Geological Survey (USGS), pro-
vides daily and weekly volcano reports to adja-
cent VAACs. Volcano observatories such as the
Kamchatka Volcanic Eruption Response Team
(KVERT) on behalf of the Institute of Vol-
canology and Seismology (IVS) Far East Branch
of Russian Academy of Sciences and the
Sakhalin Volcanic Eruption Response Team of
the Institute of Marine Geology and Geophysics,
provide not only daily and weekly volcano
reports but also timely eruption information
about volcanoes in Kamchatka Peninsula and
Kurile Islands.
Volcano activities in Japan are monitored by
four JMA Volcanic Observations and Warning
Centers (VOWCs) located in Sapporo, Sendai,
Tokyo and Fukuoka. VAAC Tokyo receives
volcanic activity reports from these VOWCs
immediately after eruptions. As the area of
responsibility of VAAC Tokyo extends to the
Philippines, the centre also receives timely
information from the Philippine Institute of
Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS).
Information provided by most of these vol-
cano observatories is called “Volcano Observa-
tory Notice for Aviation” (VONA). While
periodical information is useful to grasp the latest
volcanic conditions, VONAs are indispensable
for timely VAA provision by VAACs, especially
with regard to the initial issuances. Given vol-
canoes in Kamchatka Peninsula are remarkably
active, VAACs Tokyo and Anchorage often
issue VAAs regarding volcanic ash clouds from
those volcanoes based on VONAs from KVERT.
KVERT was established in 1993 aiming at
improving safety for aviation during explosive
eruptions. It has a similar goal to VAACs to
reduce the risk of aircraft encountering volcanic
ash clouds in the Northern Paciﬁc region through
timely detection of volcanic unrest, tracking of
ash clouds, and prompt notiﬁcation of airlines,
civil aviation authorities, and others about the
hazards (Gordeev and Girina 2014; Neal et al.
2009a, b). The complex analysis of published
data on volcanic activity and the data from
22 years of KVERT’s continuous monitoring of
volcanoes allows a quantitative evaluation of the
hazard posed by volcanoes to aviation. The level
of hazard to aviation from each of the Kam-
chatkan volcanoes is communicated by KVERT
using the Aviation Colour Code recommended
by ICAO (2004). When KVERT issues a VONA,
it is automatically disseminated to VAACs
Anchorage, Darwin, Montreal, Tokyo and
Washington, and all international and local users
of the Northern Paciﬁc region such as ICAO,
FAA, NOAA, AVO, USGS, the Yelizovo
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Airport Meteorological Center (Yelizovo AMC),
the Kamchatka Hydro-Meteorological Center
(KHMC), the Kamchatka Branch of the Ministry
for Emergency Situations (KB MES), and mass
media. It is also automatically uploaded on the
KVERT website: http://www.kscnet.ru/ivs/kvert/
van/ (Girina and Romanova 2015).
Adding to the volcanoes in Kamchatka
Peninsula, several volcanoes in Japan are also
very active; therefore, VAAC Tokyo frequently
issues VAAs in this regard based on VONAs
from JMA’s VOWCs.
Based on VONAs from volcano observatories
adding to volcanic ash clouds detection in
satellite imagery, VAACs issue VAAs designed
to assist MWOs in preparing international stan-
dard Signiﬁcant Meteorological Information
(SIGMET) on volcanic ash clouds. VAAs,
describing the latest extent and forecast trajec-
tories of volcanic ash clouds, are updated every
six hours so long as ash clouds are identiﬁed by
satellite imagery. The VAAs are issued within
the six hours if unforeseen changes occur in
observations. The roles of relevant organizations
and regulations of operations are given by ICAO
(2007).
3 Case Study of Impacts
of a Volcano Eruption onto Air
Traffic
The impacts of volcanic eruptions are the stron-
gest triggers for improvements in volcanic ash
responses by relevant organizations because they
give a true account of tasks to overcome as well
as successful operations. This section shows two
case study examples of major volcano eruptions
and subsequent actions taken by relevant
organizations.
3.1 Case Study #1
Eruption of Sarychev-Peak Volcano in 2009
An eruption of Sarychev-Peak Volcano in the
Kurile Islands was detected at 01:59 UTC on
June 12, 2009. VAAC Tokyo identiﬁed the
eruption from satellite imagery and issued the
ﬁrst VAA at 06:49 UTC with an observed vol-
canic ash cloud at 34,000 ft extending to the east.
On the day of the eruption, only ﬁve aircraft
requested re-routing; however, the volcanic ash
cloud in the VAAC Tokyo’s area of responsi-
bility reached 54,000 ft the next day according to
the VAA issued by VAAC Tokyo, and the vol-
canic ash cloud continued to be observed at that
height for one and a half days. As a result of the
VAAs, most flights avoided the NOPAC route
and flew through Russian airspace instead.
As it was a continuous eruption with ash
emission, the volcanic ash cloud extended more
and more widely. It migrated into VAAC
Washington’s area of responsibility, also cover-
ing a small part of VAAC Anchorage’s region,
while volcanic ash clouds due to subsequent
emissions covered VAAC Tokyo’s area of
responsibility. VAACs Tokyo and Washington
(and later VAAC Anchorage) issued VAAs and
advisories in graphic format (Volcanic Ash
Graphic: VAGs) (Fig. 3). As the volcanic ash
cloud covered a wide area across the NOPAC
region, the Air Trafﬁc Management Center in the
Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB/ATMC) set
the Paciﬁc Organized Track System (PACOTS)
avoiding the NOPAC route based on the VAAC
Tokyo’s advisories. Oakland Air Route Trafﬁc
Control Center (ARTCC) set westward PACOTS
based on the advisories provided by VAAC
Washington and requested JCAB/ATMC also to
set eastward PACOTS in the same way.
The volcanic ash cloud remained relatively
high even after it lowered from the maximum
height. Following a request from an airline,
VAAC Tokyo therefore began providing
VAA/VAG every three hours instead of the
regular six-hour interval from around 09:00 UTC
on June 16. Under this situation, some irregular
incidents occurred and JCAB/ATMC as well as
the Oakland ARTCC responded to each case. For
example, a particular aircraft headed into the
volcanic ash cloud area without knowing the
situation and JCAB/ATMC was obliged to
advise re-routing. Another example was that one
particular airline, flying on a regional route in
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Southeast Asia, wished to request rerouting, but
did not know where to make a request, so
JCAB/ATMC in Japan and the Oakland ARTCC
coordinated with JCAB/ATMC taking the role to
respond to the request. Considering the situation,
JCAB/ATMC issued a NOTAM at 12:53 UTC
on June 22 describing the need to collect infor-
mation about the volcanic ash cloud caused by
the Sarychev-Peak Volcano eruption.
VAAC Washington ended advisory provision
in its area of responsibility at 05:00 UTC on June
19. VAAC Tokyo announced the volcanic ash
cloud dissipation at 02:52 UTC on June 23 and
the VAAC Anchorage at 07:30 UTC on June 25.
As the volcanic ash cloud remained for more
than ten days, the impact on aviation operations
was signiﬁcant.
During this event, close communication
between JCAB/ATMC and the Oakland ARTCC
assisted successful collaborative operations. The
flexibility of VAAC Tokyo in providing VAAs
every three hours instead of the regular six-hour
interval was also user-friendly because airlines
were able to re-route with minimum detours based
on the frequently-updated advisories. However, at
the same time, this event highlighted a necessity
for thorough information distribution so that no
aircraft operates toward the volcanic ash cloud
area (McGimsey et al. 2014; JMA/VAAC Tokyo
2010; NOAA/VAAC Anchorage 2015b;
NOAA/VAAC Washington 2015).
3.2 Case Study #2
Eruption of Kliuchevskoi Volcano in 2013
A strong explosive and effusive eruption of
Kliuchevskoi Volcano in the middle of Kam-
chatka Peninsula started on August 15, 2013 and
lasted until December 20, 2013, with repeated
eruptions and ash dissipation. VONA and
VAA/VAGs on November 19 reported that the
ash reached above 40,000 ft; however, the
paroxysmal phase of eruption on October 15–20,
in which explosions sent volcanic ash up to
around 30,000–33,000 ft each time, was proba-
bly the most signiﬁcant phase of the activity,
because the volcanic ash cloud extended across
the boundary of VAACs Tokyo and Anchorage’s
areas of responsibility and both VAACs issued
advisories for their respective areas of responsi-
bility (Girina et al. 2014a, b; JMA/VAAC Tokyo
2014; KVERT/VONA 2013; NOAA/VAAC
Anchorage 2015b).
The volcanic ash cloud moved to the south-
east and partially migrated into VAAC Anchor-
age’s area of responsibility at around 18:00 UTC
Fig. 3 VAGs by VAACs Tokyo (left) and Washington
(right) issued at 06:22 UTC and 06:24 UTC on 14 June
2009, respectively, for a volcanic ash cloud covering a
wide area from Sarychev-Peak Volcano in Kamchatka
peninsula in VAAC Tokyo’s region to VAAC Washing-
ton’s area of responsibility. VAG is composed of four
maps with volcanic ash cloud areas at present (left top),
six hours ahead (right top), twelve hours ahead (left
bottom) and eighteen hours ahead (right bottom), and
explanatory in text. Here, only maps are extracted from
the original VAGs (he texted information is not shown)
6 Y. Igarashi et al.
on October 18. VAAC Anchorage then consulted
with VAAC Tokyo on future plans of
VAA/VAG issuances. VAAC Tokyo decided to
continue VAA/VAG issuances but from 00:54
UTC on October 19, VAAC Tokyo handed over
the responsibility for some part of the volcanic
ash cloud, which had migrated into VAAC
Anchorage’s area of responsibility. The volcanic
eruption continued with volcanic ash clouds
continuously produced. Once VAAC Tokyo
handed over the responsibility for some part of a
volcanic ash cloud that had migrated into VAAC
Anchorage’s region, another volcanic ash cloud
extended across the boundary of the VAACs
areas of responsibility a few hours later, insti-
gating another handover. In this way, the
VAACs provided VAA/VAGs for their respec-
tive airspaces, that is, the ash area was divided
into two following their areas of responsibility
(the entire volcanic ash cloud area could not be
obtained in either single VAA/VAG). In addi-
tion, each VAAC uses its own diffusion model
for forecasting volcanic ash cloud areas, so the
results differ slightly. For this event, the results of
the two VAACs were inconsistent, each having
issued VAA/VAGs for their own region without
coordination with the other (Fig. 4). An airline
made an inquiry as to the difference of volcanic
ash cloud extent in the VAA/VAGs issued by
VAACs Tokyo and Anchorage, which high-
lighted the difﬁculty for airline users when two or
more VAACs issue advisories for volcanic ash
clouds caused by the same eruption individually
without adequate coordination. In such cases,
users need to obtain and monitor two advisories
for one event. If the advisories have a gap that
cannot be ignored, users will have difﬁculty in
understanding the situation.
As the volcanic ash cloud moved to the
southeast and approached VAACs Washington
and Montreal, those VAACs also issued transfer
VAAs. When an ash cloud is approaching within
300 nautical miles from the boundary of areas of
responsibility, VAACs to which the ash is
approaching are required to transfer VAAs from
a VAAC with volcanic ash in its airspace (ICAO
2004). In this way, as the volcanic ash cloud
covered a wide area over the boundaries of
multiple VAACs’ areas of responsibility, not
only the volcanic ash cloud itself but also the
situation that multiple VAACs issued VAAs
and/or VAGs for its respective area of responsi-
bility had an impact on users (JMA/VAAC
Tokyo 2014; NOAA/VAAC Anchorage 2015b;
NOAA/VAAC Washington 2015).
4 Particular Challenges
of International Coordination
in Volcanic Ash and Visions
of the Future
As volcanic ash clouds flow regardless of bor-
ders, international cooperation/coordination is
indispensable. Smooth communication between
VAACs as well as among all the related orga-
nizations is essential in order to ensure safety. It
is essential for volcano observatories, MWOs
and VAACs to provide information on volcanic
eruptions and sequential volcanic ash cloud dif-
fusions to users such as airlines, civil aviation
authorities, and relevant organizations in a way
that users can grasp the situation easily. Users
need to prepare effective risk management pro-
cedures and protocols for such cases. Close
coordination/communication between informa-
tion providers and users is required for smooth
response against volcanic ash cloud emissions.
Both information providers and users need to be
prepared for various types of cases considering
volcano locations, eruption duration, volcanic
ash cloud propagation and coverage, as prefer-
able responses may differ for each type. Adding
to such preparation, a language skill is also
required. As English is the standard international
aviation language, some organizations in non-
native English speaking countries encounter a
language barrier that makes it difﬁcult to
coordinate/communicate smoothly, speedily and
in detail.
Therefore, both information providers and
users have been undertaking various efforts
regarding the requirements, including efforts of
eliminating language barriers. This section
introduces some of the particular challenges
being addressed by them.
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Challenges being taken by information providers
When a volcanic ash cloud flows from the area
of responsibility of a certain VAAC to another, the
responsibility to issue VAAs is to be handed over.
This situation frequently occurs between VAACs
Tokyo and Anchorage: when a volcano in Kam-
chatka or Kuril Islands erupts, the volcanic ash
cloud often migrates into the area of responsibility
of VAAC Anchorage. VAAC Tokyo then hands
over its responsibility to VAAC Anchorage. One
important aspect to note here is, aircraft need to
continue their flights across the Northern Paciﬁc
region under a consistent risk management
approach, regardless of which VAAC is respon-
sible. Therefore, the forecast extent of volcanic ash
clouds in VAA/VAGs from VAAC Tokyo before
a handover and from VAAC Anchorage after the
handover should not have inconsistencies. Con-
sidering the frequent occurrence of a handover as
well as the necessity of providing consistent
advisories between the two VAACs before and
after the handover, there are particular challenges
in coordination.
Fig. 4 a Observed (present) volcanic ash cloud extent in
a left top of a VAG from VAAC Tokyo before handover
which was issued at 23:59 UTC on 18 October 2013. The
volcanic ash cloud area surrounded by a dotted line was in
VAAC Tokyo’s region and that surrounded by a solid line
was in VAAC Anchorage’s region. b VAGs from VAACs
Tokyo (left) and Anchorage (right) after the handover for
the same volcanic ash cloud issued at 00:54 UTC and
02:20 UTC on 19 October 2013, respectively. From these
issuances, the VAACs started to provide VAA/VAGs for
the volcanic ash cloud in their respective areas of
responsibility individually. The volcanic ash extent in
the VAGs had a big gap especially for forecasts at 12 and
18 h ahead. c VAGs from the VAACs at 04:45 UTC and
04:15 UTC on 19 October 2013, respectively. The gap in
the VAGs became smaller but still inconsistency remained
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(1) Guideline of handover procedures
VAACs Anchorage and Tokyo have prepared
a speciﬁc form called “Handover Request Sheet
(HRS)” in which necessary items are already
included both in English and Japanese (Fig. 5).
When a case that requires a handover occurs, the
VAACs complete necessary parts on the sheet
Fig. 5 Handover request sheet used between VAACs Anchorage and Tokyo. Necessary items for handover procedures
are already in the sheet both in English and Japanese
HANDOVER PROCEDURES 
BETWEEN 
THE VOLCANIC ASH ADVISORY CENTRES 
ANCHORAGE AND TOKYO 
May 06, 2015 
Fig. 6 Guideline of handover procedures. Criteria to
conduct a handover is documented for eruption types such
as single (short duration) eruptions, intermittent eruptions
and continuous eruptions with a volcanic ash cloud
moving to the east, south or west
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and exchange it in order to simplify and speed up
the procedures. Additionally, the two VAACs, in
advance, shared information on decision-making
criteria on how and when to conduct handover
procedures. This is because the timing to han-
dover may well be different between VAACs
depending on the situation, especially when a
volcanic ash cloud extends across the areas of
responsibility of both VAACs. The criteria have
been coordinated and documented as a guideline
(Fig. 6) in order that both VAACs can expect
beforehand how the other centre will act with
Handover procedures from Tokyo to Anchorage
- Type 3: Continuous (long duration) eruption (case 2: propagating eastward) -
Condition: some part of an ash cloud due to a continuous eruption diffuses eastward, crosses the 
boundary of the AoRs from the Tokyo VAAC s side and approaches the meridian of 180 E 
longitude.
Handover: the Tokyo VAAC requests a hand-over to the Anchorage VAAC and the Anchorage VAAC 
sends back an AS.
Further action in case the Anchorage VAAC accepts the request:
the Tokyo VAAC issues a VAA stating in RMK that some part of the volcanic ash cloud 
has moved out of its AoR and it notifies the necessity of checking VAAs both from the 
Tokyo and Anchorage VAAC. Once a handover is done, both VAACs will issue VAAs only 
for the ash cloud in their own AoR, regardless of 180 E.
Note: even after some parts of the ash cloud crosses the boundary of the AORs, the Tokyo VAAC 
basically continues to issue a VAA for the whole ash cloud until it approaches 180 E
considering the convenience for users, though there may be some exceptional cases.
Example of a VAA
FVFE01 RJTD DDhhmm
VA ADVISORY
DTG: YYYYMMDD/hhmmZ
VAAC: TOKYO
VOLCANO: SHEVELUCH 300270
PSN: N5639E16122
AREA: RUSSIA
SUMMIT ELEV: 3283M
ADVISORY NR: YYYY/nnn
INFO SOURCE: MTSAT-2
AVIATION COLOUR CODE: NIL
ERUPTION DETAILS: VA EMISSIONS CONTINUING. (or other comments depending on the situa?on.)
OBS VA DTG: DD/hhmmZ
OBS VA CLD: (observed VA area)
FCST VA CLD +6 HR: (forecast VA area)
FCST VA CLD +12 HR: (forecast VA area)
FCST VA CLD +18 HR: (forecast VA area)
RMK: THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOME PART OF ASH IS BEING TRANSFERRED TO ANCHORAGE. PLS SEE FVAK21 
PAWU ISSUED BY ANCHORAGE WHICH DESCRIBES CONDITION OVER OR NEAR THE TOKYO AREA. WE KEEP 
ISSUING VAA FOR THE VA CLD IN OUR AREA.
NXT ADVISORY:  YYYYMMDD/hhmm=
Scenario of Eruption:
1. Tokyo issues VAA
2. Tokyo keeps issuing VAA and hands over to Anchorage once the cloud reaches 180E
3. Both Anchorage and Tokyo issue VAA for their own AoRs
4. When the eruption ends and the cloud becomes obviously apart from the volcano, Anchorage issues VAA for the 
whole cloud
1 2 3 4
Fig. 6 continued
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volcanic ash clouds moving towards/across the
border of their areas of responsibility.
As described in the case study of the eruption
of Kliuchevskoi Volcano in 2013, it is not
user-friendly if two VAACs provide VAA/VAGs
with a volcanic ash cloud area for their own
individual areas of responsibility and/or if
VAA/VAGs from two VAACs are inconsistent.
Therefore, for continuous eruptions, VAACs
Anchorage and Tokyo agreed to issue
VAA/VAGs from one VAAC as much as pos-
sible even after the volcanic ash cloud area
Handover procedures from Tokyo to Anchorage
- Type 3: Continuous (long duration) eruption (case 3: propagating southward) -
Condition: some part of an ash cloud due to a continuous eruption diffuses southward, crosses the 
boundary of the AoRs from the Tokyo VAAC s side and is expected to enter the AoR of 
the Washington VAAC.
Handover: the Tokyo VAAC requests a hand-over to the Anchorage VAAC and the Anchorage VAAC 
sends back an AS. The Tokyo VAAC informs the Washington VAAC of the situation.
Further action in case the Anchorage VAAC accepts the request:
the Tokyo VAAC issues a VAA stating in RMK that some part of the volcanic ash cloud 
has moved out of its AoR and it notifies the necessity of checking VAAs from the Tokyo,
Anchorage and Washington VAAC.
Note: even after some parts of the ash cloud crosses the boundary of the AORs, the Tokyo VAAC 
basically continues to issue a VAA for the whole ash cloud. Discussion on heights and areal 
coverage of the plume will be held whenever necessary in order to reach a reasonable 
agreement between Anchorage and Tokyo.
Example of a VAA
FVFE01 RJTD DDhhmm
VA ADVISORY
DTG: YYYYMMDD/hhmmZ
VAAC: TOKYO
VOLCANO: SHEVELUCH 300270
PSN: N5639E16122
AREA: RUSSIA
SUMMIT ELEV: 3283M
ADVISORY NR: YYYY/nnn
INFO SOURCE: MTSAT-2
AVIATION COLOUR CODE: NIL
ERUPTION DETAILS: VA EMISSIONS CONTINUING. (or other comments depending on the situa?on.)
OBS VA DTG: DD/hhmmZ
OBS VA CLD: (observed VA area)
FCST VA CLD +6 HR: (forecast VA area)
FCST VA CLD +12 HR: (forecast VA area)
FCST VA CLD +18 HR: (forecast VA area)
RMK: THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOME PART OF ASH IS BEING TRANSFERRED TO ANCHORAGE. PLS SEE FVAK21 
PAWU ISSUED BY ANCHORAGE AS WELL AS FVXX21 KNES BY WASHINGTON WHICH DESCRIBE CONDITION FOR 
THE VA CLD IN EACH AREA. WE KEEP ISSUING VAA FOR THE VA CLD IN OUR AREA.
NXT ADVISORY:  YYYYMMDD/hhmm=
Scenario of Eruption:
1. Tokyo issues VAA
2. 3. Tokyo keeps issuing VAA for the whole ash cloud
4. When the eruption ends and the cloud becomes obviously apart from the volcano, Anchorage issues VAA for the 
whole cloud
1 2 3 4
Fig. 6 continued
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extends across the boundary of their areas of
responsibility.
For example, when a volcanic ash cloud, due
to a continuous eruption at a certain volcano in
VAAC Tokyo’s airspace, extends to the east
crossing the boundary of the areas of responsi-
bility and covers a large area from the volcano to
VAAC Anchorage’s region, VAAC Tokyo con-
tinues to issue advisories for the entire volcanic
ash cloud until it reaches 180°E so that airlines
can grasp the current and future extent of vol-
canic ash cloud from VAA/VAGs provided by
one VAAC (Tokyo). When it crosses 180°,
VAAC Tokyo hands over the responsibility to
VAAC Anchorage for a part of the volcanic ash
cloud which has migrated into VAAC Anchor-
age’s region. The VAACs cannot avoid provid-
ing VAA/VAGs from the two VAACs for a
while, but once the eruption ends and the vol-
canic ash cloud separates from the volcano,
VAAC Tokyo immediately conducts a handover
for the entire volcanic ash cloud to VAAC
Anchorage (Fig. 7).
When a volcanic ash cloud from a continuous
eruption at a certain volcano in VAAC Tokyo’s
airspace extends to the south crossing the
boundary of VAACs Tokyo and Anchorage’s
areas of responsibility and/or VAACs Anchorage
and Washington’s regions, VAAC Tokyo con-
tinues to issue advisories for the entire volcanic
ash cloud with necessary coordination with the
other two VAACs about the height and extent of
the volcanic ash cloud. The timing of handover
varies, depending on the situation in this case,
but when the eruption ends and the volcanic ash
cloud moves to the south separated from the
volcano, it is agreed that VAAC Tokyo imme-
diately hands over the responsibility for the entire
volcanic ash cloud to VAAC Anchorage, and
VAAC Anchorage sequentially conducts a han-
dover to VAAC Washington if the volcanic ash
cloud still exists and is moving to the south
(Fig. 8).
When a continuous eruption at a certain vol-
cano in VAAC Anchorage’s airspace produces a
volcanic ash cloud to the west migrating into
VAAC Tokyo’s area of responsibility, VAAC
Anchorage will continue issuing VAA/VAGs
until it reaches 160°E, though this situation sel-
dom occurs. Then, if the volcanic ash cloud
continues moving to the west across 160°E and
migrates into VAAC Tokyo’s region, VAAC
Anchorage hands over the responsibility for a
part of the volcanic ash cloud that crossed 160°E
to VAAC Tokyo. In the same way as mentioned
previously, once the eruption ends and the vol-
canic ash cloud moves to the west separated from
the volcano, VAAC Anchorage immediately
conducts a handover for the entire volcanic ash
cloud to VAAC Tokyo (Fig. 9).
Phase 1                               Phase 2                              Phase 3                               Phase 4
Fig. 7 Handover procedures for a continuous eruption at
a volcano in VAAC Tokyo’s area of responsibility with a
volcanic ash cloud extending to the east. Triangle and
rectangle indicate a volcano and a volcanic ash cloud
area, respectively. The boundary of VAACs is drawn with
a solid line and 180°E is drown with a dotted line. Phase
1: volcanic ash cloud is in VAAC Tokyo’s area of
responsibility and VAAC Tokyo issues VAA/VAG.
Phase 2: volcanic ash cloud migrated into VAAC
Anchorage’s area of responsibility extending from the
volcano in VAAC Tokyo’s region, but it remains west of
180°E, so VAAC Tokyo issues VAA/VAG for the entire
volcanic ash cloud. Phase 3: volcanic ash cloud crossed
180°E so both VAACs Anchorage and Tokyo issue
VAA/VAGs for their own areas of responsibility. Phase 4:
eruption ended with volcanic ash cloud obviously apart
from the volcano, so VAAC Tokyo conducts a handover
and VAAC Anchorage issues VAA/VAGs for the entire
volcanic ash cloud
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Information sharing on decision-making cri-
teria is also done for single (short duration)
eruptions and intermittent eruptions. The proce-
dures for single (short duration) eruptions are
more straight-forward. VAACs Anchorage and
Tokyo agreed to hand over the entire volcanic ash
cloud when more than half of it has migrated into
the neighbouring VAAC’s area of responsibility.
The procedures for intermittent eruptions are also
relatively straight-forward, because intermittent
eruptions are, as it were, repeated single erup-
tions. VAACs agreed to repeat the procedures for
single eruptions applying to newer ash clouds
generated by intermittent eruptions.
(2) Challenge to collaborative decision analysis
and forecast via chat system
In order to provide consistent advisories
before and after the handover, it is better to share
forecasters’ thoughts before volcanic ash clouds
actually cross the border of the areas of respon-
sibility, especially for a complicated or excep-
tional situation. Therefore, VAACs Anchorage
and Tokyo have started testing a chat system for
closer and more flexible communication. NOAA
has provided its proprietary chat system and
created an account for this challenge (Osiensky
et al. 2014). As part of the test, the VAACs are
Case 1   Case 2 - Phase 1                 Case 2 - Phase 2                 Case 2 - Phase 3
Fig. 9 Handover procedures for a continuous eruption at
a volcano in VAAC Anchorage’s area of responsibility
with a volcanic ash cloud extending to the west. Triangle
and rectangle indicate a volcano and a volcanic ash cloud
area, respectively. The boundary of VAACs is drawn with
a solid line and 160°E is drown with a dotted line. Case 1:
volcanic ash cloud migrates into VAAC Tokyo’s area of
responsibility extending from the volcano in VAAC
Anchorage’s region, but it remains east of 160°E, so
VAAC Anchorage continues issuing VAA/VAGs for the
entire volcanic ash cloud. Case 2: (Phase 1) volcanic ash
cloud is in VAAC Anchorage’s area of responsibility and
VAAC Anchorage issues VAA/VAG. (Phase 2) volcanic
ash cloud crosses 160°E and VAAC Anchorage conducts
a handover for a part of the volcanic ash cloud that has
migrated in VAAC Tokyo’s region. Both VAACs
Anchorage and Tokyo issue VAA/VAGs for their own
areas of responsibility. (Phase 3) eruption ended with
volcanic ash cloud obviously apart from the volcano, so
VAAC Anchorage conducts a handover and VAAC
Tokyo issues VAA/VAGs for the entire volcanic ash
cloud
Phase 1 Phase 2                              Phase 3                        Phase 4
Fig. 8 Handover procedures for a continuous eruption at
a volcano in VAAC Tokyo’s area of responsibility with a
volcanic ash cloud extending to the south. Triangle and
rectangle indicate a volcano and a volcanic ash cloud
area, respectively. The boundary of VAACs is drawn with
a solid line and 180°E is drown with a dotted line. Phase
1: volcanic ash cloud is in VAAC Tokyo’s area of
responsibility and VAAC Tokyo issues VAA/VAG.
Phase 2–3: volcanic ash cloud migrates in neighbouring
VAACs’ areas of responsibility but is still extending from
the volcano in VAAC Tokyo’s region, so VAAC Tokyo
issues VAA/VAGs for the entire volcanic ash cloud with
necessary coordination among the relevant VAACs for its
height and extent. Phase 4: eruption ended with volcanic
ash cloud obviously apart from the volcano, so VAAC
Tokyo conducts a handover and VAAC Anchorage issues
VAA/VAGs for the entire volcanic ash cloud
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aiming at ﬁnding necessary speciﬁc patterns of
phenomena as well as phrases of questions and
answers corresponding to them, and creating a
template like a frequently-asked questions-sheet
so that the communication will be smooth
between members including non-native English
speakers.
The ﬁrst test was held in July 2014 based on a
scenario of the past eruption at Kliuchevskoi in
October 2013, in which a volcanic ash cloud
moved far southeast. As the VAA/VAGs were
not user-friendly in those days as described
earlier, the VAACs prepared a scenario following
the current guidelines on handover procedures
introduced previously that had been established
between them in spring 2014, as shown in Fig. 6,
and conducted the test. The second test was held
in December 2014 based on a scenario of the
eruption at Sheveluch in September 2014, in
which a volcanic ash cloud moved to the north
and where the timing of dissipation was not clear.
The third test was held in July 2015 based on a
scenario of the eruption at Sheveluch in March
2015, in which a volcanic ash cloud moved to the
south and migrated into both VAACs Anchorage
and Washington’s areas of responsibility. Not
only VAACs Anchorage and Tokyo but also
VAAC Washington took part in the third test to
check if communication/coordination among the
three VAACs would work well via a chat system.
After that, operational use of the chat system was
utilized on a trial basis instead of through
scheduled tests that required coordination ahead
of time. If this trial proves to be successful and
becomes fully operational in these VAACs, it
could be used as a model case and applied to
coordination/communication, not only between
VAAC Tokyo and other organizations, but
between other VAACs and volcano observatories
particularly in the area where English is not the
native language.
Challenges being taken by information users
The cooperation/coordination introduced
before is undertaken by VAACs essentially as
information providers. Considering the impor-
tance of international cooperation and
coordination mentioned earlier, Volcanic Ash
Exercises are conducted in some regions under
the framework of ICAO. The ﬁrst exercise was
established in ICAO European and North
Atlantic (EUR/NAT) region called the VOLCEX
and has been conducted since 2008. Realizing
the effectiveness of the VOLCEX, a similar
exercise in the EUR (EAST) Region including
Kamchatka Peninsula started in 2013 recognising
that this region experiences frequent volcanic
eruptions that often affect aviation operations
especially around the NOPAC routes. Therefore,
an exercise in this region, named VOLKAM, has
been conducted and is making good progress in
coordination procedures between all participating
parties (air navigation service providers, air
trafﬁc management centres, aeronautical infor-
mation services, volcano observatories, VAACs,
MWOs and users such as airlines). So far,
VOLKAM has been held every year: the ﬁrst
exercise was held from 21:00 UTC on January
15, 2013 to 06:00 UTC on January 16, 2013, the
second one from 21:00 UTC on March 4, 2014 to
04:00 UTC on March 5, 2014 and the third one
from 22:00 UTC on April 15, 2015 to 04:00
UTC on April 16, 2015. The exercises have a
different focus each time and participants test
new challenges during the exercises (ICAO
2014a, b, 2015a, b; JCAB 2015).
In addition to the volcanic ash exercises, when
airlines make a detour at an actual eruption, they
need to coordinate with relevant organizations
for re-routing. The Cross Polar Trans East Air
Trafﬁc Management Providers Working Group
(CPWG) is dealing with the topic of international
coordination for re-routing and JCAB is one of
the members of CPWG.
The following are examples of the challenges
being met by participants of the exercises
including airlines, and/or members of CPWG.
(1) Determination of a re-route according to a
scenario and a matrix on a response for a
re-routing request
Once a notiﬁcation of an eruption is received
by a dispatcher, the potential impact to flights that
are already en-route is evaluated and if the impact
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is expected, re-routing procedures will be taken.
Re-routing should be conducted immediately
because an encounter with a volcanic ash cloud
may cause a fatal accident; even a small amount
of volcanic ash can cause enormous ﬁnancial
costs with respect to repairing engines and other
parts. As all flights in the volcanic ash-affected
region undertake re-routing procedures, it should
be well organized to accommodate all of them in
a limited number of routes, considering the issue
of remaining fuel. Additionally, there are regu-
lations and/or restrictions in each State, such that
re-routing options are not always accepted.
Hence, it is quite effective to prepare a possible
contingency route based on an assumed eruption
in advance, even if it is a paper-plan and only
used during an exercise. As this route has cleared
the political issue and other conditions (like a fuel
amount), it could be a realistic alternative route in
case of a sudden eruption, surely saving time in
coordination and implementation.
However, procedures for responding to a
request for re-routing are not currently stan-
dardized as described in the case study for the
eruption of Sarychev-Peak Volcano in 2009; they
differ depending on the ANSP. It may be better if
a standardized procedure among all ANSPs is
prepared, but this is difﬁcult because of various
restrictions in each country, and it will take time
to achieve. For example, airlines expect
re-routing procedures for aircraft in flight to be
conducted using the Air Trafﬁc Service Com-
munication (ATSC) via air trafﬁc control centres,
while the ground system of air trafﬁc control
centres in some countries cannot process
re-routing messages from aircraft in flight
because transaction between pilots and air trafﬁc
controllers are prioritized. Another example is
that some countries apply a license system and
requires aircraft to obtain permission from an
authorized organization when they fly over par-
ticular airspaces. If an aircraft requests re-routing
over such countries in order to avoid volcanic ash
cloud, it needs to obtain permission that will take
time. Therefore, before pursuing this ideal to
prepare a standardized procedure among all
ANSPs, it has been set as a primary goal to create
a matrix on each ANSP’s status when it receives
a request for re-routing so that airlines can easily
grasp the present situation. This work originated
from the volcanic ash exercise VOLKAM. Cur-
rently the task has been dealt with in the frame-
work of CPWG, so all the members of CPWG
including FAA and JCAB can work on this issue.
In addition, it is also regarded as an important
aspect to consider how to enable organizations
related to the matrix to obtain the volcanic
eruption information; this is an on-going task as
well. The matrix may be tested in VOLKAM
sometime in the future once a draft version is
prepared (ICAO 2014a, b).
(2) Use of VOLKAM sheet
Similar to the collaborative decision analysis
and forecast via a chat system being conducted
between VAACs Anchorage, Tokyo and Wash-
ington, a spreadsheet named VOLKAM Sheet,
prepared by JCAB/ATMC, was workshopped by
participants of the volcanic ash exercise in 2015,
in an effort to organize relevant information in
one sheet chronologically and reduce the issue of
language barriers. The VOLKAM Sheet contains
chronological information on a present situation
for the eruption phase, volcanic ash cloud area,
influence in trafﬁc flow and aircraft operations
based on the volcanic ash cloud conditions, as
well as the information about the expected
coordination and actions among the relevant
organizations such as a flow control of aircraft,
resetting PACOTS and the timing of the next
VAA/VAG, and other information issuances.
A remarks column is prepared in the sheet in case
there are any special notes to share (Fig. 10).
During the exercise, each organization sent
this VOLKAM Sheet to all participants via
e-mail, with an organization name and a version
number so that everybody understood which
spreadsheet was the latest one to add new
information about the present situation and/or
planned actions. The usability of this sheet to
improve situation awareness among the relevant
organizations was tested during the exercise in
2015. The participants understood the idea that it
would be better to prepare a communication
method rather than a phone call, considering that
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they respectively have three languages as a
native tongue, English, Russian and Japanese.
When a spreadsheet with necessary information
is shared, the merits are that it can at least avoid
mishearing and misunderstanding, and the par-
ticipants can read what was discussed again later.
The exercise in 2015, which tested the
usability of written information on the VOLKAM
sheet, highlighted areas for improvement. One
prospect for improvement is to share the infor-
mation via a website rather than a spreadsheet.
The website would have access limited only to
relevant organizations, where participants would
have the ability to directly edit and update the
website ensuring it remains current with the latest
information.
5 Summary
Volcanic ash cloud can seriously affect aircraft
and air services by causing engine failure, poor
visibility due to ash-related scouring of aircraft
windshields and take-off/landing delays due to
ash accumulation at airports. As volcanic ash
may cause a fatal accident and also as it crosses
borders, it is essential to provide coherent and
consistent volcanic ash-related information to
airlines, civil aviation authorities, MWOs and
other relevant organizations to avoid aviation
disasters. Hence, international cooperation and
coordination with the efforts of meteorological,
volcanological and civil aviation authorities from
multiple countries is indispensable.
Along with the requirement for proper infor-
mation issuances and smooth coordination
among relevant organizations, various efforts
have been taken in some regions. As for the
Northern Paciﬁc region, volcanoes in Kamchatka
Peninsula are remarkably active: this brings
particular challenges for related organizations
because a volcanic ash cloud frequently moves
across the boundary of VAACs Tokyo and
Anchorage’s areas of responsibility. They need
to conduct handover procedures whenever it
occurs, and especially when the volcanic ash
cloud covers the NOPAC routes, ATMCs, ACCs
and airlines coordinate for re-routing.
Fig. 10 VOLKAM Sheet used in the volcanic ash
exercise in 2015: it was prepared by JCAB/ATMC with
columns for the information on a present situation,
expected actions and remarks. Participants of the exercise
put some information that they have and shared the sheet
during the exercise. Information was added in order of
time
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Among recent eruptions, those of Sarychev-
Peak Volcano in 2009 and Kliuchevskoi Volcano
in 2013 are introduced in this chapter as examples
to illustrate successes and ongoing challenges of
international eruption response coordination.
In this respect, VAACs Anchorage and Tokyo
are working on a smoother handover and con-
sistent information issuances using English.
JCAB/ATMC and other aviation-related organi-
zations are making similar efforts in a volcanic
ash exercise in 2015 to grasp all the relevant
information in one sheet in chronological order.
The aim is to overcome language barriers, using
a VOLKAM Sheet mainly for discussion on
re-routing by sharing the present situation of the
eruption phase, volcanic ash area, influence onto
the trafﬁc flow and aviation operations, as well as
the expected coordination and actions by relevant
organizations. The planning process itself for
re-routing in the exercise is also meaningful: that
will contribute to shorten the time required for
coordination in a real case. In addition, an effort
to share the present situation of each ANSP,
responding to a re-routing request, by creating a
matrix on such information has begun; members
of CPWG are working on this task aiming at
establishing a standardized procedure among all
the ANSPs, as a long-term ideal outcome.
In this way, the volcanic ash- and/or aviation-
related organizations will continue their work
seeking for better coordination and operations,
respectively.
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